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POTENTIAL COMPETITION DOCTRINE AND FTC V. STERIS 
CORP. 
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Basic economic theory states that markets and consumers are usually 
best served when there is vigorous competition in a free market, with 
competitors battling over price and quality.  For this reason, antitrust law 
recognizes the preservation of competition as its primary goal.1  During the 
1960s and 1970s,2 antitrust enforcement agencies responded to an increase 
in merger activity by challenging many transactions under Section 7 of the 
Clayton Act.3  The newly recognized potential competition doctrine was an 
effective legal tool upon which the agencies relied in non-horizontal merger 
cases before the Supreme Court.  It has been forty-three years since the 
Supreme Court last ruled on a potential competition case, however, and their 
less-than-clear-precedent on the subject has led to lower courts crafting 
difficult and inconsistent standards.  In FTC v. Steris, a district court in Ohio 
recently rejected the government’s potential competition argument, finding 
that a merger between two of the largest firms in the already concentrated 
contract sterilization industry4 did not violate Section 7.  Despite being the 
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 1  Mission, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/atr/mission (last visited Apr. 10, 
2018) (“The goal of the antitrust laws is to protect economic freedom and opportunity by 
promoting free and fair competition in the marketplace.  Competition in a free market benefits 
American consumers through lower prices, better quality and greater choice.  Competition 
provides businesses the opportunity to compete on price and quality, in an open market and 
on a level playing field, unhampered by anticompetitive restraints.  Competition also tests and 
hardens American companies at home, the better to succeed abroad.”). 
 2  See generally Thomas M. Hurley, The Urge to Merge: Contemporary Theories on the 
Rise of Conglomerate Mergers in the 1960s, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 185 (2006).  
 3  15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012).  Section 7 of the Clayton Act deems a merger or acquisition 
unlawful if it may “substantially lessen competition.”  Id.  The Federal Trade Commission 
and Department of Justice are the two main federal agencies who file antitrust challenges. 
 4  The contract sterilization industry consists of companies that contract with 
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only sub-theory under the potential competition doctrine endorsed by the 
Supreme Court, the FTC did not argue its case under the perceived potential 
competition theory.  Instead, the decision hinged on a single element under 
the actual competition theory—a sub-theory with higher evidentiary burdens 
and without explicit Supreme Court approval.  Unsurprisingly, the court 
concluded that the FTC did not carry its evidentiary burden under the actual 
potential competition theory.  It is unclear why the FTC chose not to raise 
the perceived potential competition doctrine.  If agencies continue to forgo 
this theory, however, the sustained allowance of non-horizontal mergers will 
pose new threats to U.S. markets. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As industries become more concentrated, consumers are increasingly 
threatened by the prospect of monopolistic behavior due to the reduction of 
competition.5  Antitrust enforcement agencies seek to prevent this 
occurrence by prohibiting certain merger or acquisition transactions that may 
have this effect; however, these transactions can provide significant 
procompetitive benefits.6  A merger, for instance, may benefit consumers 
and markets by augmenting innovation and efficiencies among the 
participating firms.7  But when these transactions occur in concentrated 
markets, they pose enhanced risks to competition.8  Congress addressed this 
concern long ago by enacting the Clayton Act in 1914, as amended by the 
Celler-Kefauver Act in 1950.9 
 
manufacturers to rid their products of unwanted microorganisms.  See FTC v. Steris Corp., 
133 F. Supp. 3d 962, 96364 (N.D. Ohio 2015). 
 5  See generally Gustavo Grullon, Yelena Larkin, & Roni Michaely, Are US Industries 
Becoming More Concentrated?, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=26120 
47 (last updated Oct. 27, 2018) (“More than 75% of U.S. industries have experienced an 
increase in concentration levels over the last two decades. . . .  Lax enforcement of antitrust 
regulations and increasing technological barriers to entry appear to be important factors 
behind this trend. . . .  Overall, our findings suggest that the nature of U.S. product markets 
has undergone a structural shift that has weakened competition.”).   
 6  Competition Guidance for Antitrust Law, FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, 
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/mergers (last 
visited Apr. 9, 2018). 
 7  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 29 
(2010), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-review/100819hmg.pdf 
(explaining the benefits that merger transactions can provide) (“Nevertheless, a primary 
benefit of mergers to the economy is their potential to generate significant economic 
efficiencies and thus enhance the merged firm’s ability and incentive to compete, which may 
result in lower prices, improved quality, enhanced service, or new products.”) [hereinafter 
2010 MERGER GUIDELINES].  
 8  Concentrated markets are harmful for competition and the DOJ recognizes this.  See 
2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 7.   
 9  The original Clayton Act only prohibited the acquisition of “stock.”  15 U.S.C. § 18 
(2012).  The Celler-Kefauver Act amended the Clayton Act to include horizontal mergers.  
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Section 7 of the Clayton Act (“Section 7”) deems mergers and 
acquisitions unlawful where the effect “may be substantially to lessen 
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”10  Congress conferred 
enforcement authority of Section 7 to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
and Department of Justice (DOJ).11  Section 7 not only covers mergers 
between competitors in the same market (“horizontal” mergers), but also 
those effectuated by non-competitors in different markets (“non-horizontal” 
mergers).12  Historically, “potential competition” was a doctrine raised in 
cases involving non-horizontal mergers. 13  Today, it is also a concept that 
can be pertinent in horizontal mergers.14 
Antitrust enforcement agencies, the Supreme Court, and a handful of 
circuit courts have recognized the role that the potential competition doctrine 
plays in preserving competition.15 Agencies often seek to protect competition 
under the potential competition doctrine—in both the future and present—
by respectively employing the actual potential competition and perceived 
potential competition theories.16 
The Supreme Court, however, has only adopted the perceived potential 
competition theory. Still, the country’s highest judicial body has not made it 
easy for the FTC to succeed.  It has been over forty years since the Court has 
 
Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-899, 64 Stat. 1225 (codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 18). 
 10  15 U.S.C. § 18. 
 11  Todd N. Hutchison, Understanding the Differences Between the DOJ and the FTC, 
A.B.A, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/publications/the_101_201_ 
practice_series/understanding_differences/ (“The DOJ and FTC share authority to enforce the 
Clayton Act and the Robinson-Patman Act.).  See 15 U.S.C. § 21 (FTC authority); id. § 25 
(DOJ authority).  Each agency typically takes the lead in reviewing mergers within certain 
industries to enforce Section 7 of the Clayton Act.  Id. § 18.  Although there may be some 
overlap, the DOJ and FTC tend to allocate merger reviews according to their respective 
expertise.  For example, the DOJ typically investigates mergers in the Financial Services, 
Telecommunications, and Agricultural Industries; the FTC typically investigates mergers in 
the Defense, Pharmaceutical, and Retail Industries.”).  
 12  Note that Non-Horizontal Mergers are now included under the same umbrella as 
“Horizontal Mergers” pursuant to the newest DOJ guidelines.  2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, 
supra note 7. 
 13  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES (1984), https://www.justice.gov/archives/atr/1984-merger-guidelines (separate 
designations between “non-horizontal” mergers and “horizontal mergers”) [hereinafter 1984 
GUIDELINES]; but see 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 7 (where all mergers are viewed 
under the category of “horizontal mergers.”).  
 14  See 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 7. 
 15  See generally Ernest H. Schopler, Annotation, Doctrine of Potential Competition as 
Basis for Finding Violation of § 7 of Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 18, 44 A.L.R. Fed. 412 (1979). 
 16  Id. at 2.  The actual potential competition doctrine seeks to prevent the removal of 
future economic benefits, whereas the perceived potential competition doctrine seeks to 
preserve present economic benefits.  See also 1984 GUIDELINES, supra note 13.   
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last ruled on such a case,17 and antitrust law has since shifted towards a more 
defendant-friendly agenda.18  Consequently, lower courts have taken it upon 
themselves to craft different and often heightened standards under the 
doctrine.19  This has substantially detracted from the FTC’s ability to 
prioritize which types of firms deserve the title of “potential competitor.” 
Part II of this Comment will first attempt to explain the rationale and 
purpose underlying the potential competition doctrine in a coherent, 
understandable manner.  Part III will then use Supreme Court precedent to 
show how the potential competition doctrine has developed over time.  Part 
IV will then critique the Supreme Court’s approach, asking whether the 
Court’s test truly captures what the potential competition doctrine seeks to 
accomplish.  Parts V & VI will then focus on the Steris decision, arguing that 
the FTC may have increased its chances of success had it relied on the 
perceived potential competition theory rather than the actual potential 
competition theory. 
II. THE POTENTIAL COMPETITION DOCTRINE: THE PERCEIVED 
POTENTIAL COMPETITION THEORY AND THE ACTUAL POTENTIAL 
COMPETITION THEORY 
A. The Potential Competition Doctrine, Generally. 
The potential competition doctrine addresses mergers between non-
competitors, which are commonly referred to as “non-horizontal mergers.”20  
Although less susceptible to antitrust scrutiny than “horizontal mergers” 
(those between competitors),21 government agencies still recognize the 
 
 17  The last Supreme Court ruling on a potential competition case was in United States v. 
Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974).  
 18  See E. GELLHORN, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 453 (3d ed. 1986) (stating that 
antitrust enforcement agencies shifted to loose enforcement after the institution of the merger 
guidelines in the 1980’s).  
 19  See Darren Bush & Salvatore Massa, Rethinking the Potential Competition Doctrine, 
2004 WIS. L. REV. 1035, 1058 (2007) (“It is unsurprising then to find that lower courts have 
only contributed to the confusion in this area by creating a number of different and conflicting 
factors to evaluate claims that the acquisition of a potential competitor will violate section 7.  
Worse still, in some cases, the courts appear to have disregarded what little guidance the 
Supreme Court has provided them.  And, many courts have become very skeptical of such 
claims entirely.”) (footnotes omitted).  
 20  Id. at 1081 n.355 (“In affirmative cases asserting the potential competitor doctrine, the 
1984 Guidelines remain in force.  As the DOJ and FTC explained upon the release of the 1992 
Guidelines: ‘guidance on non-horizontal mergers is provided in Section 4 of the Department’s 
1984 Merger Guidelines, read in the context of today’s revisions to the treatment of horizontal 
mergers.’”) (citations omitted)).  
 21  1984 GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at § 4 (“Although non-horizontal mergers are less 
likely than horizontal mergers to create competitive problems, they are not invariably 
innocuous.”).  
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negative effects that non-horizontal mergers can pose on competition.22  
Specifically, agencies address the future effects a non-horizontal merger may 
have on competition by employing the actual potential competition theory.23  
Generally, this theory states that the transaction removes the possibility that 
the two firms would have competed within the same market in the future.24  
When arguing a potential competition case, agencies often also seek to 
protect the present procompetitive effects a non-horizontal merger may have 
by employing the perceived potential competition theory.25  This theory 
states that a given transaction may remove present procompetitive influences 
that the acquired firm has on the target market, which stems from the target 
market’s perceptions of the acquired firm’s ability to enter the target 
market.26  Thus, the sub-theories’ respectively focus on whether the acquired 
firm had an actual or perceived ability to enter the acquiring firm’s market. 
At first glance, these two theories may seem complex and 
intimidating—especially for those not familiar with antitrust law.27  In order 
to alleviate some of this confusion, this Comment will now further explain 
the basic rationale and frameworks underlying these two theories and 
specifically, why their convoluted legal substance has broad implications for 
agencies when bringing a potential competition case. 
1. The Actual Potential Competition Theory: An 
Objective Standard 
Consider Outback Steakhouse (Outback), a business that largely 
competes with other sit-down restaurants within the casual dining market.28  
 
 22  Id. (“[N]on-horizontal mergers involve firms that do not operate in the same market.  
It necessarily follows that such mergers produce no immediate change in the level of 
concentration in any relevant market . . . non-horizontal mergers are less likely than horizontal 
mergers to create competitive problems . . . .  In some circumstances, the non-horizontal 
merger of a firm already in a market (the ‘acquired firm’) with a potential entrant to that 
market . . . may adversely affect competition.”) (footnotes omitted).  
 23  Bush & Massa, supra note 19, at 1046 (“The competitive effect from actual potential 
competition occurs in the future.”).  
 24  Id.  
 25  Id. (stating “[w]hen the transaction or conduct is aimed at a potential competitor that 
is constraining market prices or having some other current, ongoing procompetitive effect, 
courts apply the perceived potential competition doctrine.  For example, courts find that 
perceived potential competition is present when competitors in a highly concentrated market 
are aware of the potential competitor and have adjusted their pricing in a more competitive 
manner to perhaps deter that firm’s entry.”).  
 26  Id.  See generally William E. Dorigan: The Potential Competition Doctrine: The 
Justice Department’s Antitrust Weapon under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 8 J. MARSHALL J. 
PRAC. & PROC. 415 (1975).  
 27  Even for those who are familiar with antitrust law, the theory still tends to garner 
confusion.  See Bush & Massa, supra note 19, at 1089 (stating “[t]he language of the tests set 
out in the 1984 Guidelines and the 1992 Guidelines also creates some confusion . . . .”).  
 28  See The Boulder Group, The Net Lease Casual Dining Market Report (Q1 2018), 
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Outback can therefore be said to reside on the edge of the drive-through fast-
food market since such is in close proximity to Outback’s casual dining 
market.29  Now, imagine that Outback is financially capable of expanding 
into the fast-food market, and is intent on doing so because of the high prices 
that fast-food restaurants charge.  Executives at McDonald’s recognize this 
probable expansion by Outback and begin to fear that the move will detract 
from McDonald’s own sales by making its market more competitive.  In an 
effort to avoid competing with Outback in the future, McDonald’s takes the 
low-road initiative and successfully executes a merger agreement with 
Outback.30  As a result, instead of having a new competitor in the fast-food 
market (which would likely pressure the fast-food giants to lower prices), the 
fast-food market ends up with a larger, more powerful McDonald’s—a 
company that can continue to charge high prices.  This example attempts to 
neatly portray why antitrust law and federal agencies have used the actual 
potential competition theory to challenge certain non-horizontal mergers that 
seem to remove the possibility of lower prices in the future. 
Now apply the previous hypothetical to a more formalized definition: 
the actual potential competition theory is premised on the notion that the 
acquired firm (Outback) may produce future procompetitive benefits in the 
acquiring firm’s market (the drive through fast-food industry) if it were not 
for the merger.31  In other words, the actual potential competition theory 
seeks to prevent non-horizontal mergers, where transactions involve an 
acquired firm that is “likely” to soon enter the acquiring firm’s market.32  
Agencies accordingly use the actual potential competition theory to target 
transactions that involve acquired firms, which have the actual ability and 
 
https://bouldergroup.com/media/pdf/2018-Q1-Net-Lease-Casual-Dining-Research-
Report.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2018) (listing financial statistics about Outback Steakhouse 
and other restaurants within the “casual dining market,” such as Hooters, Chili’s, and Red 
Lobster).  
 29  For purposes of this Comment, “close proximity” means that the two markets are 
somewhat similar.  “Market proximity,” however, is a legal term that attempts to portray the 
similarity of markets in objective terms.  Joseph F. Brodley, The Potential Competition 
Doctrine Under the Merger Guidelines, 71 CAL. L. REV. 376, 389–401 (1983) (“Proximity is 
determined by: (1) the similarity between the two markets in terms of critical entry 
characteristics, such as production, marketing, technology, and transactional relations; and (2) 
actual observed entry between the two markets, or from the outside market into a market 
closely similar to the inside market.  If according to these criteria the proximity between 
markets is close, it can be presumed that the acquiring firm has an entry advantage.”).  
 30  Scienter on the part of McDonald’s is not required under the actual potential 
competition theory; however, for the sake of this example, consider that such is present.   
 31  See Donald F. Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 
HARV. L. REV. 1313, 1362–86 (1965).  This author actually endorses the actual competition 
theory, but also discusses how many critique the theory as well.   
 32  Id.  This may be done by either “de novo entry,” where a firm independently enters a 
market, or by “toe hold acquisition,” where a firm acquires a small firm in the market in order 
to gain entry.   
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intent to enter the market of the acquiring firm, prior to the merger.33 
These types of transactions therefore raise red flags for antitrust 
agencies.  In their joint guidelines, the FTC and DOJ state: “[b]y eliminating 
the possibility of entry by the acquiring firm in a more procompetitive 
manner, the merger could result in a lost opportunity for improvement in 
market performance resulting from the addition of a significant 
competitor.”34 
Make sense?  Well, in the context of Section 7, the Supreme Court is 
unsure.  The country’s highest judicial body has not adopted the theory35 and 
as a result, neither have all federal courts.36  This widespread absence of 
approval is largely due to the commonly-held view that the theory is 
inconsistent with plain-reading interpretations of Section 7.37  Namely, 
critics claim that since the language of Section 7 prohibits only mergers that 
threaten to reduce present competition, the law should not bar mergers that 
take away the potential for increased competition in the future.38  Still, the 
theory has garnered lower court approval on account that enforcement 
agencies consistently raise it in the cases they bring.39  Therefore, many 
courts adjudicate actual potential competition issues,40 albeit in the absence 
 
 33  Id.  
 34  1984 GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at 25.   
 35  See United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974).  
 36  The Eighth Circuit has approved of the doctrine, as have the Seventh and Tenth 
Circuits.  See Yamaha Motor Co. v. FTC, 657 F.2d 971, 977 (8th Cir. 1981); Ekco Products 
Co. v. Federal Trade Com., 347 F.2d 745, 752–53 (7th Cir. 1965); Kennecott Copper Corp. 
v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67, 74–79 (10th Cir. 1972).  “Other circuits, including the First, Second, 
Fourth, Fifth, and District of Columbia have not decided the issue.  A number of lower courts 
have utilized the doctrine in hearing Section 7 challenges to mergers.” 2 CORPORATE 
ACQUISITIONS AND MERGERS § 10.02 (2018).  
 37  On its face, Section 7 does not require a company to take the action most likely to 
make a market more competitive; Section 7 simply proscribes certain acts that may 
substantially decrease competition.  Another objection to the actual potential competition 
theory is that if market forces are to be relied on to create consumer satisfaction, the 
presumption should be that the decision of a firm to enter a market by merger is the best and 
most efficient choice.  See CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS AND MERGERS, supra note 36; see also 
Turner, supra note 31, at 1362–86. 
 38  See, e.g., DOMINICK T. ARMENTANO, THE MYTHS OF ANTITRUST 235 (1972); Stanley 
D. Robinson, Recent Developments: 1974, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 243 (1975); Richard A. 
Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution 
Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 282, 323–24 
(1975). But see Turner, supra note 31, at 1383 (“[T]here is a rather modest case for prohibiting 
a merger between a firm that would clearly enter the market by internal expansion and a 
leading or growing established firm in a tight oligopoly.”). 
 39  See generally FTC v. Steris Corp., 133 F. Supp. 3d 962, 966 (N.D. Ohio 2015) 
(acknowledging that although the Supreme Court has not endorsed the actual potential 
competition doctrine, it will be accepted by the Court because the FTC recognizes its validity).  
 40  E.g., id. 
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of clear Supreme Court precedent.41  This is problematic for lower courts 
that adjudicate actual potential competition issues since these courts are 
seemingly free to develop their own standards without pushback. 
The only potential guidance influencing lower court standards stems 
from statements the Supreme Court gave in dicta.42  In United States v. 
Marine Bancorporation, the Supreme Court suggested that the following 
preconditions must be met if an argument concerning the actual potential 
competition theory were to prevail: 
(i) The target market must be concentrated; 
(ii) The acquiring firm must have feasible means for entering 
the market other than by making the challenged 
acquisition, that is, by de novo entry or entry by foothold 
or toe hold acquisition;43  and 
(iii) Those means must offer a substantial likelihood of 
ultimately producing deconcentration of that market or 
other significant precompetitive effects.44 
Following the Court’s holding in Marine Bancorporation, many lower 
courts have remained skeptical of the actual potential competition doctrine 
since the Supreme Court ultimately failed to explicitly endorse the theory.45  
Other courts, however, have heightened element two— the theory’s hallmark 
element—by requiring the FTC to show by “certain proof” that the acquired 
firm was likely to enter the acquiring firm’s market.46 
2. The Perceived Potential Competition Theory 
In returning to Outback, it is safe to say that companies within the fast-
food market are vigilant of companies like Outback, which reside on the edge 
of the drive-through fast-food industry.  And it logically follows that 
McDonald’s, Wendy’s, and Burger King want to avoid potential competition 
with new fast-food chains.  In an effort to dissuade Outback from believing 
that its transition will be profitable, these fast-food chains may be 
incentivized to constrain the prices of their food.  Preserving this pre-
emptive, procompetitive behavior of target market firms is the goal of 
 
 41  The Supreme Court has addressed the actual potential competition doctrine but has not 
endorsed it.  See generally, United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602 
(1974). Therefore, the Supreme Court has not explicitly approved a framework or analysis for 
the actual potential competition doctrine.  
 42  See Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. at 633.  
 43  This is the element at issue in FTC v. Steris, which will be discussed infra Parts V and 
VI.   
 44  Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. at 633. 
 45  See supra note 42 and accompanying text.  
 46  See FTC v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 549 F.2d 289, 293–95 (4th Cir. 1977).  
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agencies under the perceived potential competition theory.47 
The perceived potential competition theory recognizes that by simply 
residing “in the wings” of the fast-food industry, Outback can exert a 
present-procompetitive influence on the fast-food market without ever 
entering.48  Compared to the actual potential competition theory, the benefits 
on competition the perceived potential competition theory seeks to preserve 
may exist notwithstanding the possibility that: (1) Outback may not actually 
intend on ever entering the fast-food market, or (2) Outback may not even 
be financially capable of entering the target market to begin with.49  Rather, 
the beneficial effect the theory seeks to preserve is dependent on: (1) whether 
firms in the target market (McDonald’s, Wendy’s, and Burger King) 
subjectively perceive Outback as a company that may enter, and (2) if that 
perception has a present-procompetitive effect on their behavior in the form 
of lower prices.50 
Courts refer to this effect as “the wings effect,”51 “the fringe effect,” 
and “the edge effect.”52  But unlike the actual potential competition doctrine, 
the Supreme Court has endorsed the perceived potential competition 
doctrine as a valid legal principle.53  Still, however, few courts have barred 
mergers on perceived potential competition grounds.54 
The 1984 Merger Guidelines include a more formalized explanation of 
the theory’s underlying rationale, in addition to the potential anticompetitive 
effects of such a transaction: 
By eliminating a significant present competitive threat that 
constrains the behavior of the firms already in the market, the 
merger could result in an immediate deterioration in market 
performance.  The Economic theory of limit pricing suggests that 
 
 47  See supra note 25 and accompanying text.  
 48  See Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. at 625. 
 49  See Bush & Massa, supra note 19, at 1046 (“[C]ourts find that perceived potential 
competition is present when competitors in a highly concentrated market are aware of the 
potential competitor and have adjusted their pricing in a more competitive manner to perhaps 
deter that firm’s entry.”).  
 50  Id.  
 51  Id. at 1042–43.  
 52  See United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729 (D. Md. 1976). 
 53  See United States v. El Paso, 376 U.S. 651 (1964). 
 54  See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972); Kennecott Copper 
Corp. v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67 (10th Cir. 1972); United States v. First Nat’l State Bancorporation, 
499 F. Supp. 793 (D.N.J. 1980); United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226, 
1234, 1254–56 (C.D. Cal. 1973), aff’d mem. sub nom.  Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 
418 U.S. 906 (1974), reh’g denied, 419 U.S. 886 (1974); In re Brunswick Corp., 94 F.T.C. 
1174, 1273 (1979), aff’d sub nom.  Yamaha Motor Co. v. FTC, 657 F.2d 971 (8th Cir. 
1981); In re Polypore Int’l, Inc., 2010 FTC LEXIS 97, at *72 n.41 (2010), concurring opinion 
at 2010 FTC LEXIS 96 (2010), aff’d, 686 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 570 U.S. 
917 (2013). 
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monopolists and groups of colluding firms may find it profitable 
to restrain their pricing in order to deter new entry.55 
Under the Marine Bancorporation framework, to successfully invoke the 
perceived potential competition doctrine, the FTC must show that: (i) the 
acquired firm has the “characteristics, capabilities, and economic incentive 
to render it a perceived potential de novo entrant,” (ii) the target market is 
substantially concentrated; and (iii) “the acquiring firm’s premerger 
presence on the fringe of the target market in fact tempted oligopolistic 
behavior on the part of existing participants in that market.”56  A fourth 
prerequisite, given in a later Supreme Court case, requires that there be few 
other potential entrants.57 
III. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT AND THE ENDORSEMENT OF THE 
PERCEIVED POTENTIAL COMPETITION DOCTRINE 
The potential competition doctrine was first recognized as a legitimate 
legal tool for antitrust enforcement in 1964 with the Supreme Court’s rulings 
in United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co. and United States v. Penn-Olin 
Chem. Co.58  The historical milieu surrounding antitrust law during this 
period is significant in that mostly all of the following cases were adjudicated 
during the 1960s and 1970s—a period marked by enhanced merger 
activity.59  Recognizing a spike in merger transactions, antitrust enforcement 
agencies adopted aggressive anti-merger policies.60  The rationale applied by 
the Court in the following two cases therefore portrays an economic 
perspective that presumed harm to competition when faced with transactions 
occurring in concentrated markets.61  Today, however, enforcement policies 
are reluctant to make such an assumption as the legal landscape surrounding 
 
 55  See 1984 GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at 24.   
 56  See United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S 602, 624–25 (1974) 
(emphasis added).   
 57  See United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 534 n.13 (1973).  This 
requirement is usually bundled with element three, because if there are many potential 
entrants, the perceptions of the acquired firm, specifically, will likely not have much of an 
effect on the target market.  
 58  United States v. El Paso, 376 U.S. 651 (1964); United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 
378 U.S. 158 (1964).  
 59  See Hurley, supra note 2. 
 60  The Development of Antitrust Enforcement, CONST. RIGHTS FOUND. (Spring 2017), 
http://www.crf-usa.org/bill-of-rights-in-action/bria-23-1-c-the-development-of-antitrust-
enforcement.html. 
 61  See Jonathan B. Baker & Carl Shapiro, Detecting and Reversing the Decline in 
Horizontal Merger Enforcement, 22 ANTITRUST 29, 29 (2008), 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/8461/250e60730e6b78bc077a74073ac0717a1cf4.pdf 
(arguing that merger enforcement during this time was overly stringent due to inflexible 
standards which relied on the “structural presumption” of harm to competition from 
increasing market concentration). 
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mergers is more defendant-friendly.62 
United States v. El Paso was the first Supreme Court case to address 
the perceived potential competition theory.63  In El Paso, the merging firms 
were both large players who sold gas in different Northwest states.64  The 
acquiring firm, El Paso Natural Gas Co. (El Paso), was the only out-of-state 
supplier in California.65  El Paso agreed to acquire Pacific Northwest 
Pipeline (Pacific) after Pacific’s tentative plan to deliver oil in California was 
terminated.66  Prior to the merger, Pacific Northwest was eager to enter the 
California market but had not yet been successful.67 
The Supreme Court ultimately barred the acquisition on potential 
competition grounds without explicitly mentioning the doctrine by name.68  
Specifically, the Court accepted the DOJ’s argument that the merger was 
capable of substantially lessening competition since Pacific was a potential 
supplier to the California market.69  The Court established a vague test for 
determining whether the transaction harmed competition, stating that “[t]he 
effect on competition in a particular market through [the] acquisition of 
another company is determined by the nature or extent of that market and by 
the nearness of the absorbed company to it, that company’s eagerness to 
enter that market, its resourcefulness, and so on.”70 
Applying this test, the Court determined that Pacific Northwest was a 
potential competitor that had a present-procompetitive effect on the 
California market.71  Although not yet within the California market, the 
Court determined that Pacific was a potential entrant since El Paso was the 
only out-of-state supplier to California, and because Pacific Northwest was 
“the only other important interstate pipeline west of the Rocky Mountains.”72 
 
 
 62  See GELLOHRN, supra note 18, at 533–34 (discussing the shift to loosen enforcement 
after the institution of the merger guidelines in the 1980s).  
 63  El Paso, 376 U.S. at 655.   
 64  Id. at 653. 
 65  Id. at 652, 652 n.2. (stating that El Paso also supplied fifty percent of the state’s natural 
gas).  
 66  Id. at 655. 
 67  Id. at 644–55. 
 68  Id. at 659.  The Court did refer to Pacific Northwest as a “potential competitor” once 
but did not generally speak of the potential competition doctrine as an established rule of law.  
Id. 
 69  El Paso, 376 U.S. at 661. 
 70  Id. at 660.  Because of the Court’s “and so on” inclusion, its list of factors is not 
exhaustive.  This allowed the possibility of more factors to be considered in later cases.  
 71  Id.  
 72  Id. at 658–59.  The Court noted that this was evident after Pacific Northwest lost a bid 
to enter the California market after El Paso subsequently made significant financial 
concessions to prevail.  Id. at 659. 
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In its reasoning, the Court foreshadowed the driving principles behind 
the perceived potential competition theory.  The Court emphasized that the 
purpose of Section 7 was “to arrest the trend toward concentration, 
the tendency to monopoly, before the consumer’s alternatives disappeared 
through merger.”73  The Court also noted that the natural gas industry was 
extremely regulated at the time, meaning that there were high barriers of 
entry for new entrants.74  The Court concluded its opinion by stating: “[w]e 
would have to wear blinders not to see that the mere efforts of Pacific 
Northwest to get into the California market, though unsuccessful, had a 
powerful influence on El Paso’s business attitudes within the State.”75  Thus, 
the most influential aspect was the fact that Pacific Northwest had regularly 
attempted to enter the California market through the submission of bids, 
which had a consequential effect on El Paso’s business decisions—
notwithstanding the fact that none of these bids were successful.76 
In United States v. Penn-Olin, the Court expanded the applicability of 
the potential competition doctrine.77  Prior to consummating a joint venture, 
Pennsalt Chemicals Corporation (Pennsalt), did not distribute its sodium-
chlorate product in a continually growing southeastern market.78  Olin 
Mathieson Chemicals Corporation (Olin), a producer of similar chemicals, 
agreed to serve as a distributor for Pennsalt’s product in the southeastern 
market after the companies formed a joint venture.79  There had been no entry 
into this heavily concentrated market in over a decade, but each company 
had independently considered entering prior to their agreement.80 
 
 
 73  Id. at 659 (quoting United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 367 (1963)).  
 74  Id. at 659–60.  High entry barriers are conditions that make it difficult for companies 
to enter a given market, making their existence a concern for antitrust enforcement agencies.  
See John B. Kirkwood & Richard O. Zerbe, Jr., The Path to Profitability: Reinvigorating the 
Neglected Phase of Merger Analysis, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 39 (2009) (discussing agencies’ 
use of “entry barriers” and varying definitions). 
 75  El Paso, 376 U.S. at 659. 
 76  Scholars view this case as concerning perceived potential competition.  See Bush & 
Massa, supra note 19, at 1047–49.  The Court, however, alludes to the notion that Pacific 
Northwest was an “actual competitor” through its attempts to enter by bidding, stating that 
“[u]nsuccessful bidders are no less competitors than the successful ones.”  Id. at 1049 (citation 
omitted). 
 77  378 U.S. 158 (1964).  See Bush & Massa, supra note 19, at 1050 (“The Penn-Olin case 
also represented a distinct expansion of the doctrine.  In El Paso, the potential entrant’s effect 
on the market was through an unsuccessful bid.  In contrast, Penn-Olin involved a joint 
venture to produce and sell sodium chlorate between two firms: one firm never served the 
geographic market that the joint venture would serve; the other never produced the chemical 
that was the relevant product.”).  
 78  Penn-Olin, 378 U.S. at 161–62. 
 79  Id.  Including the joint venture, the market consisted of only three firms.  Id. at 163.  
 80  Id. at 164–66. 
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The Supreme Court held that the lower court erred in applying the 
potential competition doctrine by only considering, “as a matter of 
probability [whether] both companies would have entered the market as 
individual competitors if Penn-Olin had not been formed.”81  The Supreme 
Court stated that the district court should have gauged whether there would 
have been a wings effect if only one of the companies had decided to enter 
the south eastern market.82  Realizing that this effect was too difficult to 
gauge, the Court concluded that the agreement did not violate Section 7.83  
The Court, however, still determined that both companies could be 
considered potential competitors.84  This conclusion was based on the 
companies’ resources, their diverse product lines, their compelling reasons 
to enter the market, their respectable reputations, and their “know-how” as 
established companies of how to effectively enter a new market.85 
The Court’s decision in Penn-Olin is important when considering the 
type of firm that might pose the most anticompetitive risks when analyzing 
the perceived potential competition theory.86  Specifically, the Court stated: 
“[t]he existence of an aggressive, well equipped and well financed 
corporation engaged in the same or related lines of commerce waiting 
anxiously to enter an oligopolistic market would be substantial incentive to 
competition which cannot be underestimated.”87 
The previous cases both recognize an important proposition under the 
perceived potential competition theory.  Namely, that: (1) courts should 
endeavor to gauge the effects a potential competitor has by residing on the 
wings of a given market, and (2) a showing of the acquiring firm’s intent to 
enter the market of the acquired firm is extremely relevant when gauging if 
the perceived potential competition theory should apply.88  The Court’s later 
holding in 1967 demonstrates why actual intent of acquired firms is not 
dispositive when determining whether present procompetitive benefits exist. 
 
 
 
 81  Id. at 172–73 (alteration in original). 
 82  Id. at 173 (“There still remained for consideration the fact that Penn-Olin eliminated 
the potential competition of the corporation that might have remained at the edge of the 
market, continually threatening to enter.”).  
 83  This was because the Court found that gauging the precise competitive effects in this 
instance was “impossible to demonstrate.”  Id. at 176.  But see United States v. El Paso, 376 
U.S. 651, 659 (1964) (where the court was able to directly show such through El Paso having 
lowered its prices in response to Pacific Northwest’s bid attempts).  
 84  Penn-Olin, 378 U.S. at 175. 
 85  Id.  
 86  Id. at 174. 
 87  Id.  
 88  This inquiry is even more relevant when showing actual potential competition, or the 
future anticompetitive effects that a transaction may have.   
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In FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., the Supreme Court ultimately barred 
Procter & Gamble’s (Procter) acquisition of Clorox on perceived potential 
competition grounds.89  Procter was a producer and distributor of a wide 
variety of household cleaning items, which, prior to the proposed acquisition, 
did not include bleach.90  Clorox, the acquired firm, was an exclusive 
manufacturer of bleach and controlled fifty percent of an extremely 
concentrated industry.91 
The lower court found that Procter was not a potential competitor since 
it had no intent, nor had made any past attempt to enter the bleach market.92  
Despite finding that Procter did not intend to enter the liquid bleach market, 
the Supreme Court reversed and found that Procter was a potential 
competitor.93  The Court made this conclusion based largely on Procter’s 
advantageous positioning in the adjacent, household cleaning-product 
market.94  Probative to the Court’s finding that Procter was the “most likely 
entrant” to the liquid bleach market were the facts that Procter sold similar 
goods, was engaged in a program to diversify its product lines, had 
substantial advantages in advertisement and merchandising, retained 
experienced managers who marketed similar goods, and could feasibly build 
an efficient plant at a reasonable cost.95  The Court also found that Procter 
had acquired Clorox for the purpose of gaining a greater share of the market 
than it could have attained had it entered independently.96 
The Court also placed heightened importance on the plethora of 
potential anticompetitive effects the merger could have had if effectuated.  It 
stated that: (1) removing Procter from the market would eradicate the present 
procompetitive effects that Procter had on the liquid bleach market by 
waiting in the wings;97 and (2) that the acquisition would deter new entry 
among smaller firms considering entering the liquid bleach market since they 
would not want to compete with the larger, newly merged Procter.98 
 
 89  386 U.S. 568 (1967).  
 90  Id. at 572. 
 91  Id. at 570–71. 
 92  Id. at 580. 
 93  See id.  
 94  Id. 
 95  Procter, 386 U.S. at 581. 
 96  Id. 
 97  Id.  The Court determined that Procter, in fact, had an effect on the market behavior of 
participants in the liquid bleach industry since it viewed Procter as one that might begin 
producing bleach.  Id.  The Court, however, did not gauge the price effect that would arise 
from the elimination of Procter as a perceived potential entrant.  Id.; see also United States v. 
Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964) (finding that doing so was impossible).  
 98  Procter, 386 U.S. at 581; see Bush & Massa, supra note 19, at 1053 (stating “the 
acquisition might discourage smaller firms considering entering the market, or already on the 
fringe”).  In stating that “[f]ew firms would have the temerity to challenge a firm as solidly 
KLIMOWICZ  (DO NOT DELETE) 11/28/2018  3:14 PM 
2018] COMMENT 187 
Six years later, the Supreme Court gave a more complete analysis of 
the perceived potential competition doctrine in United States v. Falstaff 
Brewing Corp.99  In Falstaff, the United States challenged a merger between 
Falstaff Brewing Company and Narragansett Brewing Company.100  Prior to 
the merger, Falstaff was one of the ten largest brewing companies in the 
U.S.101  Falstaff had not sold its products in the New England market prior 
to the merger, but publicly expressed interest in doing so on multiple 
occasions.102  Instead of eventually entering de novo, however, Falstaff 
decided to purchase Narragansett—a company that held a twenty percent 
share of the New England market.103 
The government employed the potential competition doctrine and 
argued that the transaction may substantially lessen competition in the New 
England market because: (1) Falstaff was a “potential entrant”; and (2) the 
acquisition eliminated competition that would have existed had Falstaff 
entered the market de novo.104  The district court rejected this contention and 
permitted the transaction, reasoning that Falstaff could not successfully enter 
the New England market de novo or through a toe-hold acquisition; it had to 
be by the acquisition of a larger brewery already in the region, such as 
Narragansett.105 
In reversing the lower court, the Supreme Court did not rely on the 
finding that Falstaff lacked the actual capability of successfully entering the 
market on its own.  Rather, the Court reinforced its holding in Procter, and 
stated that the district court had “failed to give separate consideration to 
whether Falstaff was a potential competitor in the sense that it was so 
positioned on the edge of the market that it exerted beneficial influence on 
competitive conditions in that market.”106  Specifically, the Supreme Court 
insisted that such an inquiry should be centered not on the internal decisions 
 
entrenched as Clorox,” the Court suggested that smaller firms will have even fewer incentives 
to enter a market dominated by an established incumbent (Clorox) that is owned by a large 
conglomerate with significant resources.  Proctor, 386 U.S. at 581.  Thus, the Court reasoned 
that the transaction would create, or increase, barriers to entry in the bleach market for smaller 
firms, perhaps significantly limiting the number of perceived potential entrants to only larger 
firms.  See id. at 578.  
 99  United States v. Falstaff Brewing Co., 410 U.S. 526 (1973).  
 100  Id.  
 101  Id. at 551. 
 102  Id.  
 103  Id. at 528 (stating that this twenty percent market share was expected to increase).  
 104  Id. at 529.  Note that not all acquisitions raise Section 7 concerns.  For instance, if 
Falstaff decided to purchase a company that held a smaller percentage of the New England 
market than Narragansett, it is probable that such a transaction would not have raised the same 
level of antitrust concerns.  
 105  Falstaff, 410 U.S. at 530.  
 106  Id. at 532–33. 
KLIMOWICZ  (DO NOT DELETE) 11/28/2018  3:14 PM 
188 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:173 
of Falstaff executives, but on whether, “given its financial capabilities and 
conditions in the New England market, it would be reasonable to consider 
[Falstaff] a potential entrant into that market.”107  The Court ultimately 
remanded the decision to the lower court to determine whether Falstaff could 
be said to influence existing competition as a potential competitor on the 
fringe of a market.108 
Considering that the lower court already found that Falstaff was 
incapable of entering independently,109 this case shows the importance the 
Supreme Court gives to showings of a wings effect when posed with 
arguments under the perceived potential competition theory.  Thus, in both 
Falstaff and Procter, the Court did not narrowly focus on whether a firm is 
likely to enter a market but for the merger.  Instead, in both cases, the Court 
corrected the lower courts for their failure to consider whether the firm in 
question had a present procompetitive influence on the target market.110  In 
the following case, however, the Court shifts its position under the perceived 
potential competition theory, and proffers heightened standards under both 
of the potential competition doctrine’s sub-theories.111 
In United States v. Marine Bancorporation, the U.S. challenged a 
proposed merger between two commercial banks.112  The Court ultimately 
prohibited the acquiring firm from engaging in a market it decided not to 
enter de novo.113  “The acquiring bank, National Bank of Commerce (NBC),” 
was a large bank based in Seattle and owned a subsidiary of the appellee, 
Marine Bancorporation.114  This firm was the second largest bank 
headquartered in the state, but had not yet been able to compete directly in 
the Spokane metropolitan area.115  The acquired firm, Washington Trust 
Bank (WTB), was a smaller bank in Spokane.116 
The government argued that the proposed merger violated Section 7, 
and argued its case under both sub-theories.117  Under the actual potential 
competition theory, the government first argued that the merger would 
eliminate the possibility of market deconcentration in the future since NBC 
could enter the Spokane market without a merger.118  Under the perceived 
 
 107  Id. at 533. 
 108  Id. at 534.  
 109  Id. at 533.  
 110  Id. at 526; FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).  
 111  United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974). 
 112  Id.  
 113  Id. 
 114  Id. at 606.  
 115  Id. at 606–07.  
 116  Id. at 607.  
 117  Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. at 614–15. 
 118  Id. at 615. 
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potential competition doctrine, the government argued that NBC’s perceived 
presence on the fringe of the Spokane market had present procompetitive 
effects.119 
Without endorsing the actual potential competition theory,120 the Court 
stated in dicta that if the government were to succeed under this theory, 
“[t]wo essential preconditions must exist . . . : (i) that in fact NBC has 
available feasible means for entering the Spokane market other than by 
acquiring WTB; and (ii) that those means offer a substantial likelihood of 
ultimately producing deconcentration of that market or other significant 
procompetitive effects.”121  Under the first prong, the Court found that state 
law barriers precluded NBC from establishing a branch bank in Spokane de 
novo,122 and suggested that that the only means that NBC could enter the 
target market was through merger.123 Under the second prong, the Court 
acknowledged that it is conceivable under state law that NBC may have been 
able to acquire smaller banks within Spokane but determined that state law 
limitations on NBC’s ability to grow those entities rendered any likely 
procompetitive effects de minimis.124 
Since the Court also rejected the government’s perceived potential 
competition argument,125 the Marine Bancorporation case further highlights 
the high evidentiary burdens that the FTC faces when arguing potential 
competition cases.  The government attempted to show that NBC was a 
perceived potential entrant that exerted present-procompetitive effects on the 
Spokane market by offering subjective evidence in the form of a 
memorandum written by an NBC officer.126  The Court, however, dismissed 
this evidence by stating that the opinions of officers of the acquiring bank, 
and not the target bank, did not establish a violation of Section 7.127  The 
Court instead applied an objective standard when gauging fringe effect, and 
stated that since rational, “commercial bankers” in Spokane were aware of 
the regulatory barriers that rendered NBC an unlikely or insignificant entrant 
 
 119  Id.  The government also proffered a third argument, stating that WTB, as an 
independent entity, would develop by internal expansion or mergers with other medium-size 
banks into a regional, or ultimately state-wide, actual competitor of NBC and other large 
banks.  Id.  
 120  Id. at 639 (stating that the Court “express[es] no view on the appropriate resolution of 
the question reserved in Falstaff” regarding the viability and means to resolve the actual 
potential competition theory).  
 121  Id. at 633. 
 122  Id. at 629. 
 123  Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. at 630.  
 124  Id. at 638. 
 125  Id. at 639–40. 
 126  Id. at 640.  The note stated, “Spokane banks were likely to engage in price competition 
as NBC approached their market.”  Id.   
 127  Id.  
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except by merger, “[i]t is improbable that NBC exerts any meaningful 
procompetitive influence over Spokane banks by ‘standing in the wings.’”128  
After an economic review of the market and concluding that no fringe effect 
was evident, the Court used objective evidence pertaining to entry barriers 
in order to make a subjective determination concerning firm perception.129 
IV. THE PERCEIVED POTENTIAL COMPETITION THEORY POST-MARINE 
BANCORPORATION: A SUBJECTIVE STANDARD? 
Admittedly, the FTC’s case in Marine Bancorporation was not strong.  
The agency was not able to proffer any legitimate subjective evidence that 
neatly showed target firm perception, nor was it able to objectively show, 
through economic data, that NBC had a fringe effect on banks in Spokane.130  
Still, the Marine Bancorporation case is important in the Court’s shift away 
from focusing on the future anticompetitive effects of a merger, like in 
Procter131 and Falstaff.132  Ultimately, however, the Court’s use of an 
objective standard when gauging fringe effect undermines any incentive to 
use the perceived potential competition doctrine. 
Marine Bancorporation essentially requires that acquired firms, such 
as Outback in the prior hypothetical, be actually capable of entering the 
acquiring firm’s market, regardless of whether the company is already 
exerting procompetitive influences, or whether the target market is overly 
concentrated.133  This standard is puzzling, in that the present procompetitive 
effects—the focus of the perceived potential competition doctrine—stem 
from subjective perceptions rather than actual capabilities. 
The objective standard the Court sets forth in Marine Bancorporation 
essentially equates the perceived potential competition theory to the actual 
potential competition theory by requiring that the acquired firm actually be 
able to enter the target market, therefore discounting the possible existence 
of strong subjective evidence.134  This issue is noticeable when considering 
the following example: where evidence shows that firms in the target market 
perceive the acquired firm as a potential entrant, but where objective 
evidence of such perception (i.e., through economic data concerning fringe 
effect) cannot be tied to those perceptions.  This risks the possibility that any 
 
 128  Id. at 639–40.  
 129  Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. at 639–40.  
 130  Id. at 640–41. 
 131  See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967). 
 132  See United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1973). 
 133  Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S at 625 (“[T]he acquiring firm’s premerger 
presence on the fringe of the target market must have in fact tempered oligopolistic 
behavior . . . .”).  
 134  See Turner, supra note 31; Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S at 625. 
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present procompetitive effects an acquired firm has on a target market will 
not be fleshed out or confirmed through objective evidence, despite 
overwhelming subjective evidence that evinces the contrary. 
Naturally, lower courts have struggled in creating consistent standards 
for determining whether a wings effect exists.135  The Supreme Court in 
Marine Bancorporation appeared to require direct evidence of such.136  
Lower courts, however, namely those in the Second Circuit, are more 
lenient.137  The Second Circuit requires only “at least circumstantial 
evidence” that the fringe presence “probably directly affected competitive 
activity in the market,” and does not compel plaintiffs to proffer any direct 
evidence of procompetitive effects in the form of direct economic data.138  
Other lower courts have even assumed that a fringe effect exists based on a 
showing of certain objective factors.139  Again, the Second Circuit’s more 
lenient standard under this analysis is more conducive to preserving the 
economic benefits that may be had under the perceived potential competition 
theory.140 
In order to understand why the objective Marine Bancorporation 
standard seems inconsistent with the basic premise of the perceived potential 
competition doctrine, consider the case of scarecrows.  Similar to how these 
human-shaped objects can deceive birds from eating crops—despite being 
unable to actually harm those birds—acquired firms can deter target-market 
firms from raising prices despite not actually being able to enter the 
market.141  Thus, simply because an acquired firm is not capable of entering 
a market does not mean it fails to provide a valuable benefit worth 
preserving—just like how a scarecrow is worth having, although it may not 
actually be able to inflict harm on birds.  Proponents of the Marine 
Bancorporation standard may say that target-market participants are not as 
naive as birds and have perfect perceptions regarding the financial 
 
 135  Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. at 640.  
 136  Id. at 625.  
 137  Tenneco, Inc. v. FTC, 689 F.2d 346, 358 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 138  Id.   
 139  United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226, 1256–57 (C.D. Cal. 1973) 
(“The objective evidence of record concerning Phillips’ capacity and motivation to enter the 
market unilaterally, Phillips’ status as the most likely potential entrant, the small number of 
other potential entrants, the feasibility of unilateral entry by Phillips, and the concentrated 
nature of the market are legally sufficient to establish that Phillips’ entry into the market 
through the Tidewater acquisition had substantial anticompetitive effects.  It must necessarily 
be assumed that the entry of an aggressive major company such as Phillips into such a market 
on a unilateral basis would have conferred substantial competitive benefits which were lost 
when it was allowed to step into the shoes of an established major factor in the market.  The 
substantiality of the anticompetitive effects of the Tidewater acquisition may be inferred from 
the objective facts present here.”).  
 140  Tenneco, 689 F.2d at 355–56.  
 141  See Bush & Massa, supra note 19.  
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capabilities and intent of acquired firms residing “on the wings.”  The FTC 
and DOJ have their doubts as to if these notions are true.142  If true, however, 
then a subjective standard can only incentivize target-market firms to do their 
research to ensure that they have every piece of necessary information. 
This anomaly underlies the difficulties courts have with this doctrine.  
Thus, prior to Marine Bancorporation, the Supreme Court recognized the 
notion that firms do not always set prices in accordance to what the rational 
market participant knows about potential entrants, by giving weight to 
subjective evidence under the perceived potential competition theory.143  In 
Marine Bancorporation, the Court objectified this analysis.144  The FTC 
states, however, that firms may have misjudged perceptions about potential 
entrants.145  So why would the Court impose a test that assumes target market 
firms have perfect knowledge?  If these firms are adjusting prices in 
accordance to these misguided perceptions, beneficial effects may exist.146  
Given antitrust law’s desire to keep markets competitive and prices low, we 
should not disrupt target-market firms’ misperceptions about potential 
entrants who are not actually capable of entering.  In essence, an objective 
standard presumes that scarecrows are only useful if they are actually 
capable of harming the birds that may enter a field of crops.  Thus, Marine 
Bancorporation’s objective standard, which requires that acquired firms 
actually be capable of entering the target market, is not warranted—just like 
robotic scarecrows capable of injuring daring birds are not needed to 
preserve crops. 
Lower courts have consequently struggled with the objective standard, 
that is, determining whether an acquired firm has the “characteristics, 
capabilities and economic incentives to render it a perceived potential entrant 
de novo.”147  This confusion has resulted in different standards across 
circuits.148  Straying away from the heightened Marine Bancorporation 
standard, lower courts have given varied degrees of weight to subjective 
perceptions.  This evidence often comes in the form of testimony from 
executive officials within the target market regarding their perceptions of the 
acquired firm, specifically to see whether they believe the acquired firm is 
 
 142  1984 GUIDELINES, supra note 13. 
 143  United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 533–36 (1973).  Falstaff had, 
in press releases and company publications, expressed an interest in distributing its product 
nationally; the Supreme Court stated that these pre-acquisition discussions were relevant in 
concluding whether Falstaff was a perceived potential entrant.  
 144  See United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 638–40 (1974).   
 145  1984 GUIDELINES, supra note 13 (stating that target-market “firms may misjudge the 
entry advantages of a particular firm”).  
 146  See Bush & Massa, supra note 19. 
 147  Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. at 624–25.  
 148  See Bush & Massa, supra note 19, at 1058.  
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one they think may enter the target market.149  The Second Circuit in Tenneco 
found the acquired firm to be a “perceived potential competitor” under 
element (i) by largely relying on the subjective perceptions of target market 
participants, notwithstanding a lack of evidence that showed the acquired 
firm had many of the “characteristics, capabilities, or incentives that” the 
framework seems to require.150  Given the difficulty in gauging a wings 
effect,151 subjective standards of this type are more desirable if agencies wish 
to preserve any economic benefits from firm perception which may be had. 
The objective standard under Marine Bancorporation, however, may 
speak more to a method of proving proximate causation rather than an 
unwarranted standard which only serves as a hurdle for the FTC.  Other 
courts, therefore, understandably narrow their focus on objective evidence, 
no matter how strongly the subjective evidence alludes to the fact that 
incumbent firms perceive the acquired firm to be a potential entrant.152 
Thus, this Comment argues that the perceived potential competition 
theory should not rest on whether the acquired firm is actually a “potential 
competitor.”  Rather, similar to the Second Circuit’s approach, the focus 
should center on whether the acquired firm is perceived by firms in the target 
market as being a “perceived potential entrant.”153  Thus, whether the 
acquired firm actually intends to enter the target market should not be 
controlling like it is under the actual potential competition theory, for the 
reasons stated above.154  That being said, actual intent (e.g., public statements 
 
 149  See, e.g., Tenneco, Inc. v. FTC, 689 F.2d 346, 355–56 (2d Cir. 1982) (considering 
testimony by industry executives as to whether they considered Tenneco, Inc. a potential 
entrant admitted, along with evidence of negotiations, Tenneco’s financial strength, and 
compatibility of products of the acquiring and acquired firm); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. 
FTC, 467 F.2d 67, 75–78 (10th Cir. 1972) (upholding FTC finding that Kennecott was a 
perceived potential entrant based on testimony of competitors and evidence about the 
company’s ability to enter the market).  
 150  Tenneco, 689 F. 2d at 353–56 (finding that the defendant could be considered a 
perceived potential entrant because incumbent firms were not aware of its lack of success in 
past attempts of entering market).  See also Ginsburg v. InBev, 649 F. Supp. 2d 943, 947–52 
(E.D. Mo. 2009) (district court granted defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings 
finding that InBev was not a perceived potential entrant based on evidence that it had actively 
withdrawn from the United States market and had entered into a long-term exclusive 
distribution agreement by which its products were imported into and distributed within the 
United States), aff’d on other grounds, 623 F.3d 1229 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 151  See Bush & Massa, supra note 19. 
 152  See, e.g., Mo. Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 863–64 (2d Cir. 
1974).  
 153  A “perceived potential entrant” is a firm that is viewed by firms in the target market 
as one that may enter the target market.  See Bush & Massa, supra note 19, at 1062.  
 154  Whether a firm intends to enter the market of the acquiring firm may not influence the 
subjective perceptions of the firms in the target market.  This element, however, is still 
relevant in objectively determining whether rational firms in the target market view it as a 
perceived potential entrant.  See id. 
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by the acquired company pre-merger) to enter a market may still be relevant 
in deciding whether companies in the target market are changing their 
behavior in response. 
V. FTC V. STERIS CORPORATION: AN ECCENTRIC RULING IN THE 
WAKE OF MARINE BANCORPORATION 
This Comment now turns to an analysis of FTC v. Steris Corp. to review 
the court’s discussion of the potential competition doctrine.155  Part V will 
first present the facts of the case.  Thereafter, this Comment will argue that 
the FTC erred by not raising the perceived potential competition theory even 
in light of the Marine Bancorporation standard.  This Comment will then 
argue that the perceived potential competition doctrine should be adjusted in 
accordance with prior precedent given the result in Steris. 
A. Facts 
In 2015, the FTC sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary 
injunction against Steris Corp. (Steris) for its proposed merger with another 
leading sterilization provider, Synergy Health PLC (Synergy).156  Steris and 
Synergy were the second and third largest firms in the contract sterilization 
service market, which consisted of companies that contracted with 
manufacturers to rid their products of unwanted microorganisms.157  
Sterigenics Corp. (Sterigenics), a third party not involved in the proposed 
merger, was the largest firm by size and revenue in the relevant market.158 
At the time of the merger, the U.S. sterilization market consisted of 
three methods of sterilization: gamma radiation, e-beam radiation, and 
ethylene oxide (EO) gas.159  Although Synergy was the largest provider of e-
beam services in the U.S., it did not have any competitive presence in the 
U.S. market for the most well-regarded method of sterilization: gamma 
radiation.160  Steris and Sterigenics held eighty-five percent of U.S. gamma 
facilities and a bulk of the U.S. market share.161  This fact compelled Synergy 
founder, Dr. Richard M. Steeves, to develop a plan which could assist 
 
 155  FTC v. Steris Corp., 133 F. Supp. 3d 962 (N.D. Ohio 2015).  
 156  Id.   
 157  Id. at 963–64. 
 158  Id. at 963. 
 159  Id. at 964.  Customers, however, may choose sterilization methods based on their 
products’ physical characteristics.  Id.  
 160  Id. (“Gamma sterilization . . . is the most effective and economical option for most 
healthcare products because of its penetration capabilities.  It is the only viable option for 
dense products (e.g., implantable medical devices) and products packaged in larger 
quantities.”).  Synergy did use gamma radiation; however, all of its facilities were located 
overseas.  Id. 
 161  Steris, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 964, 967. 
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Synergy in attracting gamma-using customers within the U.S.162  Steeves 
identified what he believed was an “industry trend” of companies switching 
from gamma to x-ray sterilization services after a major product 
manufacturer engaged in this switch.163  This motivated Steeves to purchase 
Daniken Corp., a Swiss x-ray sterilization provider.164  Steeves made the 
purchase with the ultimate goal of implementing commercialized x-ray 
sterilization in the U.S. market, which, according to the FTC, was a viable 
alternative to gamma radiation for its “‘possibly superior’ depth of 
penetration and turnaround times.”165 
Following the purchase of Daniken, Steeves presented his plan to the 
Board of Directors in 2012.166  Steeves recognized numerous issues Synergy 
needed to overcome for x-ray sterilization to be successfully implemented in 
the U.S., which consisted of: (1) building facilities within the U.S. at a cost-
effective price; (2) overcoming customer reluctance in switching from 
gamma to x-ray radiation; and (3) securing customer commitments in the 
form of financial backing.167  By the fall of 2014, Synergy was successful in 
securing non-binding “letters of interest” from a number of large 
customers.168  Synergy, however, was unable to secure any financial backing 
in the form of “take-or-pay contracts,” which appeared necessary if the plan 
were to ultimately be approved.169 
In October of 2014, Steris publicly announced its plans to merge with 
Synergy.170  Despite this development, Synergy’s x-ray plan continued 
“unabated” for a three-month period following the announcement.171  During 
this time, Synergy expressed optimism regarding the plan in a few statements 
that were made public.172  Specifically, Synergy announced that one of its 
major customers secured “[Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”)] 
approval of a Class III medical device . . . paving the way for further 
conversions,” and that an exclusive agreement with a manufacturer of x-ray 
equipment would allow it “to get started with x-ray in the U.S.”173  Synergy’s 
 
 162  Id. at 966–967.  
 163  Id. at 964, 967.  
 164  Id. at 967. 
 165  Id.   
 166  Id. at 968.  
 167  Steris, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 971. 
 168  Id. 
 169  Id. at 978, 981 (stating that little risk for the project could be tolerated since the plan 
to implement x-ray sterilization in the United States would take up a significant portion of 
Synergy’s budget, thus forcing it to forgo other investment opportunities).  
 170  Id. at 973.  
 171  Id. 
 172  Id. at 974. 
 173  Steris, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 974.  
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failure in securing customer commitments via take-or-pay contracts 
continued, however, and in February of 2015, Synergy informed the FTC 
that it was cancelling its x-ray plans due to this financial shortcoming.174 
B. Arguments and Ruling 
The FTC argued that the merger should be barred under the actual 
potential competition theory, insisting that but for the transaction, Synergy, 
a United Kingdom-based company, would not have discontinued its plan to 
compete directly for customers with Steris by introducing commercialized 
x-ray sterilization services to the U.S..175  The FTC contended that the merger 
barred future procompetitive benefits that would have resulted when 
Synergy entered the U.S. market—an event that the agency insisted was 
likely to occur but for the merger taking place.176 
The district court denied the FTC’s motion for preliminary injunction, 
finding that the FTC “failed to show, by a preponderance of evidence, that 
[the FTC] is likely to succeed on the merits in the upcoming administrative 
trial.”177  Crucially, the FTC did not employ the perceived potential 
competition doctrine when arguing the merger’s unlawfulness. Rather, the 
FTC chose to solely argue under the actual potential competition theory.178  
After preliminary hearings, the court further narrowed the case’s focus to 
only one issue under the actual competition theory, which was, “whether, 
absent the acquisition, the evidence shows that Synergy probably would have 
entered the U.S. contract sterilization market by building one or more x-ray 
facilities within a reasonable period of time.”179 
In addition to noting the technical difficulties companies would have in 
switching from gamma to x-ray sterilization,180 the driving factors behind the 
court’s ruling were (1) Synergy’s failure to secure financial commitments 
from customers, and (2) “its inability to lower capital costs” involved with 
the project.181  Thus, the district court concluded that future competition 
between the two firms was unlikely, based largely on the fact that the FTC 
failed to show that Synergy’s plan was financially feasible and capable of 
 
 174  Id. at 976. 
 175  Id. at 964, 966. 
 176  Id. at 964 (“Synergy’s planned x-ray sterilization facilities would have targeted Steris’ 
and Sterigenics’ gamma sterilization customers, providing them with options for contract 
sterilization and resulting in lower prices and improved quality.”). 
 177  Id. at 984. 
 178  Id. at 966. 
 179  Steris, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 966.  
 180  Id. at 982–83 (stating that companies would have to go through many regulatory 
hurdles, which included conducting studies and tests, seeking FDA approval, and analyzing 
the costs associated with the switch).  
 181  Id. at 984. 
KLIMOWICZ  (DO NOT DELETE) 11/28/2018  3:14 PM 
2018] COMMENT 197 
positive implementation in the near future.182 
VI. ANALYSIS 
A. The Court’s Decision 
The court viewed many of the same factors in its analysis that the 
Supreme Court applied in Marine Bancorporation when deciding whether 
Synergy was likely to enter the U.S. market.183  Specifically, the Steris court 
focused on objective criteria and emphasized Synergy’s financial positioning 
in deciding whether it had “the available feasible means” of entry.184  Despite 
finding against the government, the court seemed to apply a lower standard 
under the actual potential competition theory by requiring only that the FTC 
show that Synergy “probably would have entered.”185  This method of 
analysis may therefore suggest that although the court applied a lenient 
standard, it still used a heightened test.186  Again, this is evident in the court’s 
focus on objective evidence regarding Synergy’s financial shortcomings, 
rather than subjective evidence, such as Synergy’s public announcements 
about its equipment manufacturing agreement and customer interest.187 
The court relied heavily on the FTC in ultimately determining to focus 
its analysis on the actual potential competition doctrine.188  Neither the 
court’s opinion nor supplementary documents extend any explanation for 
why the FTC chose not to bring the claim on perceived potential competition 
grounds,189 which begs the question of why the FTC decided not to argue its 
case under this sub-theory. 
B. Analyzing the FTC’s Strategy 
The FTC decided not to bring the perceived potential competition 
doctrine for reasons not stated in the opinion.190  Therefore, why the agency 
did not also argue that the merger was unlawful because it potentially 
removed present procompetitive effects on the U.S. market is unclear.  
 
 182  Id. 
 183  See id. at 962. 
 184  See United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 602 (1974) 
(discussing the actual potential competition doctrine).  
 185  But see FTC v. Atl. Richfield Co., 549 F.2d 289, 300 (4th Cir. 1977) (requiring a 
showing of “clear proof” of entry under the actual potential competition theory). 
 186  Thomas N. Dahdouh, 2015: A Year of Big Plaintiff Wins in Antitrust and Privacy 
Cases, 25 COMPETITION: J. ANTITRUST, UNFAIR COMPETITION L. SEC. ST. B. CAL. 38, 58–61 
(2016).  
 187  See Steris, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 982–84.  
 188  Id. at 966.  
 189  See id.  
 190  Id. 
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Instead, the FTC’s reliance on the actual potential competition theory 
ultimately forced the agency to argue that Synergy was likely to enter the 
U.S. market—a burden that it was unable to overcome.  Before scrutinizing 
the FTC for not bringing the perceived potential competition theory, it is 
important to analyze the framework the FTC uses to decide under which 
theories to pursue the claims. 
1. Was the FTC Justified in Bringing the Claim? 
The 1984 Merger Guidelines proscribe the framework agencies should 
follow when determining whether to bring a claim, as well as what theories 
they should proffer.191  When first considering whether a claim is justified, 
the Merger Guidelines employ a “single structural analysis” when gauging 
mergers that may present either type of harm.192  This analysis considers a 
list of objective factors that direct agencies to evaluate the harmful effects a 
specific merger may present, and if they are severe enough to justify a 
challenge to the merger.193  These factors include: market concentration, 
conditions of entry generally, the acquiring firm’s entry advantage, the 
market share of the acquired firm, and efficiencies.194 The Merger Guidelines 
then consolidate this approach into three requirements: (1) the target market 
must be concentrated;195 (2) entry into the target market must not be 
“generally easy;”196 and (3) the potential entrant must be uniquely 
advantaged to enter the target market.197 
After considering this approach, it is hard to say that the FTC did not 
have sound reasons to bring a claim.  The U.S. market for contract 
sterilization services was essentially controlled by two firms: Steris and 
Sterigenics, who together controlled an overwhelming percentage of the 
market.198  Thus, the first element (target market concertation) within the 
FTC’s structural analysis is met without question.  Since the FTC ultimately 
did bring the claim, it is presumptively sound to state that it believed 
elements two (entry barriers) and three (unique advantages to entry) were 
attainable as well—the contract sterilization certainly contained high entry 
 
 191  1984 GUIDELINES, supra note 13.   
 192  See id. at § 4.13.  
 193  Id.  
 194  See id. at §§ 4.131–135. 
 195  Agencies use the Herfindhal Hirschman Index (HHI) when gauging market 
concentration and are “unlikely” to challenge a merger unless the index exceeds 1800.  Id. at 
§ 4.131 
 196  Bush & Massa, supra note 19, at 1085 (“As the ease of entry increases, incumbent 
firms are less likely to raise their price in response to an acquisition involving potential 
entrants because other firms could easily become producers in the market if prices rose 
modestly.”).  
 197  1984 GUIDELINES, supra note 13.   
 198  FTC v. Steris Corp., 133 F. Supp. 3d 962, 964 (N.D. Ohio 2015).   
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barriers, and it can easily be argued that Synergy was uniquely positioned to 
enter the target market relative to other companies. 
2. Should the FTC Have Argued Under the Perceived 
Potential Competition Theory? 
After deciding to ultimately bring a claim, the Merger Guidelines then 
advise the agencies as to which theory under the potential competition 
doctrine is most likely implicated.199  Specifically, the Merger Guidelines 
recognize that both the actual and perceived potential competition theories 
serve distinct functions, which become implicated based on the positioning 
of the firms and the nature of their markets.200  In describing the relationship 
between the two theories, the 1984 Merger Guidelines state: 
If it were always profit-maximizing for incumbent firms to set 
price in such a way that all entry was deterred and if information 
and coordination were sufficient to implement this strategy, harm 
to perceived potential competition would be the only competitive 
problem to address.  In practice, however, actual potential 
competition has independent importance.  Firms already in the 
market may not find it optimal to set price low enough to deter all 
entry; moreover, those firms may misjudge the entry advantages 
of a particular firm and, therefore, the price necessary to deter its 
entry.201 
Thus, the Guidelines state that present procompetitive effects via lower 
prices are not always present due to the misconstrued perceptions of 
incumbent firms.202  This fact, according to the FTC, gives the actual 
potential competition theory separate and distinct importance.203 
Given this section of the Guidelines, it is foreseeable that the FTC 
believed Steris and Sterigenics had misconstrued perceptions of Synergy as 
a potential competitor, or that they just simply did not “find it optimal to set 
prices low enough to deter new entry.”204  In other words, the agency may 
not have argued under the perceived potential competition doctrine because 
it did not have sufficient data showing that Synergy’s position on the edge 
of the market had a present procompetitive effect on the U.S. sterilization 
market. 
 
 
 
 199  1984 GUIDELINES, supra note 13.  
 200  Id.  
 201  See id. at §4.12 (emphasis added). 
 202  “Incumbent firms” in the Steris case would be Steris and Sterigenics.  
 203  1984 GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at 25.  
 204  Id.   
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Although the court’s opinion does not outline the conditions of the U.S. 
sterilization market, evidence does show that Synergy’s customers were 
interested in the idea of x-ray sterilization.205  This could lead to the 
conclusion that prices in the market were high to begin with.206  The 
stronghold that the incumbent firms had on the market, however, along with 
their ability to continually raise prices, should have been enough to bar the 
merger—that is, if the FTC were to balance the other factors. 
Overall, the strategy of bringing only one potential competition claim 
is inconsistent with the fact that agencies often employ both the actual and 
perceived potential competition theories when litigating potential 
competition cases.207  In fact, courts have considered instances where only 
one theory is addressed to be somewhat unusual.208  Additionally, the 
Supreme Court has taken the initiative multiple times in cases where only 
one theory was alleged, and has remanded lower court rulings for further 
findings under the perceived potential competition theory.209 
The evidentiary incentives for agencies to bring a claim under both 
theories are substantial since it may permit a wider range of evidence—
specifically, that which concerns both the future and present effects that a 
given merger has on the target market.210  Thus, if the FTC litigated the 
perceived potential competition claim, it would have been able to probe into 
 
 205  FTC v. Steris Corp., 133 F. Supp. 3d 962, 971 (N.D. Ohio 2015). 
 206  Id. at 973 (considering testimony concerning interest for new sterilization method 
because of high prices with gamma radiation).  
 207  See, e.g., United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964) (involving both 
aspects of the potential entrant theory).  As recently as 2010, the FTC found a consummated 
merger was illegal in one market and that liability could have been premised on either of the 
two perceived potential competition theories.  In re Polypore Int’l, Inc., 2010 FTC LEXIS 97, 
at *72 n.41 (2010).  
 208  See FTC v. Atl. Richfield Co., 549 F.2d 289, 293 n.6 (4th Cir. 1977) (“[The] FTC has 
not argued that the perceived or fringe effect potential entrant theory is applicable here, most 
likely due to the long lead time for successful entry.  [The] FTC’s claim to relief is therefore 
somewhat unique in that most decisions which have considered the potential entrant theory 
have usually confronted both aspects of that theory and not solely the actual potential entrant 
theory.  As a consequence, it is difficult to extract from those cases the component that is 
applicable to the instant case.  The task is not lightened by the fact it is the perceived potential 
entrant theory which has been the accepted one.”).  
 209  See United States v. Falstaff Brewing Co., 410 U.S. 526 (1973); see also FTC v. 
Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967) (where the Court remanded back to the lower 
court for a finding on perceived potential competition grounds).  
 210  This may also result in potential spillover during discovery, where evidence pertaining 
to one theory may assist in showing another.  For example, there may be an instance where 
because only one theory is alleged, only one discovery process pertaining to one theory is less 
likely.  This limits the ability for discovery to mostly matters that concern the acquired firm’s 
financial capabilities and likelihood of entering the target market.  It is foreseeable though 
that if both theories are alleged, perceptions of the acquired firm along with its competitors 
would be discoverable, and thus able to assist some aspects of the actual potential competition 
theory even though those inquiries were not initially seen as relevant.  
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the subjective evidence of firms in the U.S. market to see whether the market 
perceived Synergy as a likely entrant, and further, if this perception had any 
present procompetitive effect on the U.S. market.  Based on the holdings in 
Procter, Falstaff, and Penn-Olin, the district court in Steris could have, and 
arguably should have, considered whether Synergy exerted any considerable 
influence on the wings of the U.S. market.  These non-binding guidelines, 
however, have since served as a replacement for judicial discretion—giving 
administrative agencies a position of dominance when asserting guideline-
based arguments in federal courts.211 
C. Could the FTC Have Succeeded Under the Perceived Potential 
Competition Theory? 
An analysis of the Steris facts using the original test given by El Paso212 
would likely lead to the conclusion that the merger would have been barred.  
Again, the Supreme Court in El Paso held that Pacific Northwest had a 
procompetitive impact on competition in the California market because they 
were on the “wings” of that market, notwithstanding the fact that Pacific 
Northwest never entered the California market, nor was it able show that it 
was likely to enter in the future.213  Synergy was similar to Pacific Northwest 
in many respects.  Like Pacific Northwest, Synergy had financial 
shortcomings and other barriers which precluded it from immediately 
entering the market.214  But, the Ohio court did not take these factors into 
account since the merger was viewed under the more stringent actual 
potential competition theory. 
The Court’s decision in Penn-Olin also addressed a multitude of factors 
that were not given consideration in the Steris case due to the district court’s 
failure to apply the perceived potential competition doctrine.215  Although 
the Court in Penn-Olin did not extend a preference of any one factor over the 
other, its description of the type of firm that raises antitrust concerns under 
the perceived potential competition theory seems to resemble a company 
similar to Synergy.  Specifically, the Court in Penn-Olin stated, “the 
existence of an aggressive, well-equipped and well financed corporation 
engaged in the same or related lines of commerce waiting anxiously to enter 
 
 211  See generally Hillary Greene, Guideline Institutionalization: The Role of Merger 
Guidelines in Antitrust Discourse, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 771 (2006).  
 212  United States v. El Paso, 376 U.S. 651 (1964); see supra notes 70–76 and 
accompanying text.  
 213  El Paso, 376 U.S. at 657–58 (“[T]he findings that Pacific Northwest, as an 
independent entity, could not have obtained a contract from the California distributors, could 
not have received the gas supplies or financing for a pipeline project to California, or could 
not have put together a project acceptable to the regulatory agencies . . . are irrelevant.”).  
 214  Id. 
 215  United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 176 (1964).  
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an oligopolistic market would be a substantial incentive to competition 
which cannot be underestimated.”216 
The only shortcoming that the Ohio court may have found with this 
description concerns the court’s finding that Synergy was unable to secure 
customer commitments and ultimately lower its capital costs.217  But the 
perceived potential competition doctrine under earlier Supreme Court 
precedent did not solely rely on whether the firm had the actual financial 
capability to enter.218  Synergy was also by no means a struggling firm which 
should not be considered “well-financed.”219  Synergy had a considerable 
budget of $40 million for investment purposes, 220 while being situated as the 
third-largest firm in their market.221  The finding that Synergy may have not 
been able to implement a complicated strategy within a short amount of time 
should not discredit the fact that it is well-financed (being the third largest 
company and worth over $500 million), aggressive (evidenced by the fact 
that Steeves even entertained this plan, and coupled with the fact that he 
purchased Daniken to make it feasible), engaged in a similar market (contract 
sterilization services), and in an oligopolistic market (competition with Steris 
and Sterigenics in the U.S. market).222  Thus, the FTC under the rationale 
proffered by Penn-Olin, could have—at a minimum—pursued a compelling 
argument that Synergy was a perceived potential entrant. 
In further applying the factors that the Court found relevant in Penn-
Olin, for gauging the precise competitive harm, the nature of the market 
certainly favors the FTC’s approach, had it employed the perceived potential 
competition argument.  The entire contract sterilization market was 
essentially controlled by three companies: Steris, Sterigenics, and 
Synergy.223  Thus, the anticompetitive harm that results from this merger 
includes that the Court considered in Procter, since new entrants will be 
dissuaded from competing in an even more concentrated U.S. contract 
sterilization market because of the merger between Steris and Synergy.224 
In Falstaff, the Court alluded to the notion that the public 
announcements of interest exerted by the acquiring firm made it likely that 
 
 216  Id. at 174.  
 217  See FTC v. Steris Corp., 133 F. Supp. 3d 962, 963 (N.D. Ohio 2015).  
 218  See El Paso, 367 U.S. at 657–58 (finding that Pacific Northwest’s financial plan to 
enter the market was irrelevant).  
 219  See Steris, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 962.  
 220  Id. at 981.  
 221  Id.  
 222  C.f. id. at 963. 
 223  See id.  
 224  See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 581 (1967) (finding anticompetitive 
effect in the consequence of new entrants be dissuaded from entering the market if Clorox 
and Procter Gamble were to merge).  
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firms in the target market were expecting their entry, thus changing their 
behavior in the market.225  In Steris, it was easily foreseeable that the plan to 
enter the U.S. market instituted by Synergy could have influenced Steris’ and 
Sterigenics’ market behavior in the U.S.  Numerous firms expressed interest 
in the plan, and Synergy advertised this plan to a large audience while trying 
to gain customer commitments.226  Thus, it seems as if subjective evidence 
regarding firm perceptions in the U.S. market would have strongly favored 
the FTC, that is, if the FTC gave itself the chance to argue that Synergy was 
seen as a perceived potential entrant by firms in the U.S. market. 
Whether the Court would have found the presence of a fringe effect is 
unknown.  This would depend on: (1) the type of evidence that is revealed 
in discovery; and (2) whether the Court gives more weight to objective or 
subjective evidence.  Under the Marine Bancorporation standard, objective 
evidence carried the day.227  The Court in Marine Bancorporation used an 
objective standard regarding what a “rational banker” with perfect 
information believed.228  It ultimately came to the conclusion that there was 
no present competitive effect since the rational banker most likely knew of 
the barriers to entry, and therefore would not perceive the firm as a potential 
entrant after considering such.229  In Steris, there were also numerous entry 
barriers: financing the project, customers gaining FDA approval, getting 
customers to switch from gamma, and, most crucially, hoping that the 
equipment manufacturers develop a machine that can support the x-ray 
radiation.230  Thus, if the Court applied the Marine Bancorporation test to a 
tee, it most likely would not have found that Steris had a fringe effect on the 
market, since the prospects of effectuating Steris’ plan were ultimately slim, 
and “rational” firms in the sterilization market would be assumed to be aware 
of all of this information.  An objective test, however, is not always applied, 
and it is certainly foreseeable based on lower court rulings that the district 
court could have used a subjective standard. 
If there was some showing of subjective evidence that could have 
revealed that Synergy did, in fact, have an effect on the target market, then 
subjective evidence could have enabled the court to overlook the objective 
evidence of Synergy’s financial capabilities.  Further, if the court applied a 
standard that assumed fringe effect, Synergy would not have to worry about 
this element altogether.231 
 
 225  United States v. Falstaff Brewing Co., 410 U.S. 526, 532 (1973). 
 226  See Steris, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 983.  
 227  See United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974). 
 228  See Steris, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 983.   
 229  Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. at 639–40.  
 230  Id.  
 231  United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226, 1256–1257 (C.D. Cal. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The court’s decision in Steris has broad implications for the legal 
community.  On its face, the Steris decision exemplifies how some of the 
largest firms in extremely concentrated industries can avoid antitrust 
enforcement.  Specifically, the Steris case shows how the Supreme Court’s 
failure to use a subjective test under the perceived potential competition 
doctrine, like the Second Circuit’s, has possibly influenced enforcement 
agencies to not bring their cases under the theory at all.  This phenomenon 
is not only historically unusual, but also concerning for antitrust agencies 
who may feel compelled to now bring cases under the more stringent actual 
potential competition theory.  If a trend away from concentration is what 
antitrust law and its enforcement agencies most desire, then a change in the 
guidelines should correct for Marine Bancorporation’s evidentiary hurdles 
under the potential competition doctrine. 
 
 
1973) (“The objective evidence of record concerning Phillips’ capacity and motivation to 
enter the market unilaterally, Phillips’ status as the most likely potential entrant, the small 
number of other potential entrants, the feasibility of unilateral entry by Phillips, and the 
concentrated nature of the market are legally sufficient to establish that Phillips’ entry into 
the market through the Tidewater acquisition had substantial anticompetitive effects.  It must 
necessarily be assumed that the entry of an aggressive major company such as Phillips into 
such a market on a unilateral basis would have conferred substantial competitive benefits 
which were lost when it was allowed to step into the shoes of an established major factor in 
the market.  The substantiality of the anticompetitive effects of the Tidewater acquisition may 
be inferred from the objective facts present here.”). 
